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BOOK REVIEWS
HAZARDOUS PRODUCT LITIGATION. By Edward M. Swartz.
Rochester: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. 1973. Pp. 416.
Cloth. $35.00.
It is unique when I find a law book for review which I can
wholeheartedly recommend to the practitioner in a particular area.
However, Edward M. Swartz's Hazardous Product Litigationis one
of those unique books, in one of the most litigious areas of modern
torts.
In the modem trial, "we try facts, not law." I think in
products litigation this is particularly true, and for a modem law
book in this field to be useful it must deal with the specifics.
Swartz's book does.
In the first chapter, the author summarizes the facts of hypothetical cases involving items that can be potentially dangerous,
and thus the subject of a lawsuit. Swartz, divides an assortment of
commonly used products into categories based on the type of
article and the potential hazard it creates: household products,
electrical appliances, flammable items, glass doors, glass explosions, cartons, automobiles, toys, playgrounds, recreational equipment, sports equipment, food and beverages, medical, military
hardware, products which produce allergic reactions, and many
others. One is soon convinced that some of the most common and
frequently used articles-floor wax, color television sets, portable
hair dryers-can become the most hazardous when negligently
designed or manufactured. The author suggests that these short
fact patterns can be used as an "immediate method of thinking
through the material which accompanies the cases at various points
in the text."1
The second chapter discusses theories of liability-negligence,
warranty, and strict liability in tort-and the defenses to those
actions. Examples of a "breach of warranty notice letter," and
other sample forms also are included. To paraphrase the Virginia
Slims ad, "Baby, you've come a long way since Winterbottom v.
'2
Wright!
The chapter on procedural considerations discusses forum
as

1. E. SWARTZ, HAzARDOuS PRODUCT LITIGATION 7 (1973)
SWARTZ].

2. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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shopping and jurisdictional problems from International Shoe
through the most recent cases. Jurisdiction is especially important
in product litigation, since the multi-state context of most product
liability cases presents the plaintiff with a choice of forums. The
exemplar forms and their citations, covering, for example, motions
for change of venue and supporting affidavits, are good.
Many product liability cases are won in the investigation stage
through deposition and discovery. The chapter on pre-pleading
investigation offers some good methods of acquiring and using
product history. Swartz recommends obtaining investigatory help
from union members and using the telephone to call fellow
lawyers. That last suggestion is a good library short cut that no
practicing lawyer should be ashamed to use.
The pleading chapter provides sample complaints and pleadings, but it is the discovery chapter which is particularly welcome.
It includes sample briefs, depositions and interrogatories; specific
suggestions on how to discover and how to do a deposition; and
checklists and descriptions of informal means of discovery. I remember once visiting an aircraft factory in Connecticut to take a
court-ordered deposition. On the bulletin board was a notice: "Be
more careful assembling tail rotors-carelessness has already
caused one fatal accident!" It was my case! I included this "discovery" in my deposition.
Use of the economist's report is discussed in the "Damages
and Settlements" chapter, as well as actual damages for specific
injuries. Swartz includes a discussion of "wrongful life," that is,
suit against manufacturers whose birth control products failed. The
"wrongful life" suit is a new breach of warranty tort which includes
elements of morality, religion and economics, but it is a viable tort.
I find the chapter on "Trial" good enough to be included in
any law book, and not specifically limited in its usefulness to the
area of products liability. The reader is taken from the fast-disappearing field of voir dire, through opening statement, examination
and cross-examination. Swartz gives excellent advice, suggesting,
for example, that "[i]f counsel feels he must take on the task of
cross-examining a technical witness . . . , he should seek to
conduct a clever collateral attack rather than encounter the expert
squarely on his own terms . . . ."' While jury instructions must be
tailored to the law of each state, Swartz describes the principal
areas to be covered in every products liability case in any state.
Sample instructions are included with citations.
The last chapter, "New Developments and Missed Opportun3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 299.
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ities," shows that hazardous products litigation is expanding and
never ending. The author suggests that there is much for the trial
lawyer to learn and try, since even manufacturers are unaware of
all the dangerous potential of their products. Thus, for example, as
we learn more about their effects, "chemical contamination in the
guise of insecticides, preservatives, colorings, hormones and artificial flavorings is one area of food contamination which is rich in
potential litigation,"' and will expand as we learn more about the
effects of chemicals.
Similarly, many lawyers overlook the opportunity afforded by
military hazardous products. I've tried a number of military hazardous products cases and I agree thoroughly with Swartz that an
injury resulting from a piece of defective military equipment can
and should be treated as an ordinary products liability case. I also
agree that "it is likely that greater investigation will be necessary to
obtain the facts needed to prove your case in the face of governmental bureaucratic inertia and the so-called Freedom of Information Act."'
One genuinely useful section describes the way in which an
entire industry may be indicted in a civil suit for its hazardous
products. It is no defense that every manufacturer in the industry
produced the commodity in the same way, if in fact the commodity
is dangerous. This is illustrated by the story related of the blasting
cap industry and its trade association. A suit in negligence and
strict liability in tort was based on industry-wide failure to place
warnings on individual blasting caps. Although it was impossible
to identify the manufacturer of the particular blasting cap which
caused the injury, there was evidence that the manufacturers had
knowledge of the danger that these products presented to children,
and evidence that they acted in concert to eliminate warning labels
required by legislation.
The book is replete with excellent citations and bibliography,
and contains practical suggestions on choosing and making use of
testing organizations and certifiers of quality.
I find HazardousProduct Litigation illustrative of a new style
of law book which combines the practical and specific facts with
the necessary academic discussion of available case and textual
authority.
Melvin M. Belli*
5. Id. at 371.
6.
Id.
* A.B. 1929, LL.B. 1933, University of California at
Berkeley (Boalt Hall);
J.D. (hon.), New England School of Law; Past Dean, International
Academy of
Trial Lawyers; Past President, American Trial Lawyers Association;
Author,
Modern Trials and Modern Damages (1954), Trial and Tort Trends
(1954-62).
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THE LAW, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS. By Ann Fagan Ginger. Woodbury, New York: Barrons
Educational Series, Inc. 1970. Pp. xv, 695. Softbound. $3.95.
The author states that the purpose of this book is to help
people "to start learning about the realities of the law."' She refers
to "a deepening interest in . . . how (and whether) the judicial
system works."2 Thus, it must be assumed that the purpose of the
book is to help students in schools and colleges, and non-lawyers
generally, to understand the Supreme Court through a study of one
particular aspect of the work of that Court. While the book would
for
be useful as a reference work for law students, it is not a text
format
the
also
but
content,
the
only
Not
lawyers and law students.
to
confirm this: except for the principal cases, the citations are left
glossary
the
Also,
book.
the
of
one of the appendices at the end
included among the appendices is obviously aimed at those who
have not studied for the legal profession.
The book is clearly successful in describing the operations of
the
the Supreme Court in the area of "the people's rights" during
in
tenure of Earl Warren as Chief Justice. The selection of that era
the history of the United States for such a study is logical. As the
the
author states, it was "the first and only era to date in which
number
significant
a
considered
has
United States Supreme Court
'
of cases in this field." The selection of topics and of cases, which
are described in detail, is fully adequate and appropriate to the
Suauthor's stated purpose. The description of the work of the
respects.
substantial
all
preme Court is accurate and complete in
in
The writing is clear and the descriptions of the cases are handled
purits
fulfill
an interesting manner. In general, the book should
period
pose and provide a useful historical reference work for the
and subject it covers.
Nonetheless, the work left me with an uneasy feeling that
of the
some important elements were understated in the treatment
it
read
I
because
partly
is
This
era.
subject, and even of the Warren
not
is
it
conceded,
author
the
as
from a lawyer's viewpoint, and,
trained in
really addressed to lawyer-readers, although the author is
has
author
the
that
the law. My trouble stems from a feeling
the
in
developments
the
somewhat oversimplified the analysis of
herself
author
The
civil rights area during the Warren tenure.
in
admits a straight line bias: while she has selected "landmarks
1. A. GINGER, THE LAW, THE SUPREME
x (1970) [hereinafter cited as GINGER].
2. Id.
3. Id. at xi.
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human rights law,"' 4 she does not consider any decision to be a
"landmark" unless it was a victory "for the proponents of
human
rights law."' In her view, when a case was lost "by the advocate
of
human rights," the law was left unsettled, because "nothing
is
settled until it is settled right."'
Although I probably would be on the same side of all
the
issues as this author, I cannot bring myself to look upon
every
decision that went the other way as simply wrong. There are
too
many judges and commentators whom I greatly respect who
have
been on that "wrong" side. Many of the judges have held
philosophical views that led them to decide against the "advocates
of
civil rights" in particular cases. Such deviations from the straight
line of the civil rights advocates are found in opinions by many
of
the justices most revered by those advocates. The list of
those
justices goes beyond Black and Frankfurter, and includes even
Earl
Warren. The author described the Shapiro decision 7 as "a blunderbuss method of denying welfare." 8 It seems to me that the dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and concurred
in by
Justice Black, which found the residence requirement constitutional, needs some philosophical analysis rather than mere quotation
of
some of the Chief Justice's words.
The author discusses the changes in American society during
the Warren era that appeared to be causes of the great increase
in
human rights cases coming before the Court. That discussion,
however, leaves unanswered the question why the justices
who
heard those particular cases both agreed to hear them and
then
formed majorities in favor of the advocates of human rights.
There
are those who believe that many of the "landmark cases"
of the
Warren era were merely the last step in a course that had
been
moving inexorably toward that outcome for many years. For
example, as the quotations from the Gideon' opinion make clear,
that
decision was foreshadowed 30 years before in the decision
of
the
Scottsboro case, 0 but the author's accompanying text does not
discuss the significance of the earlier decision as a landmark
on the
way to the Warren Court's holding.
Not only did I miss emphasis on the ancient underpinnings
of
the civil rights decisions of the Warren era, but I also
missed
adequate credit to the many lawyers and lower court judges
whose
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at xii.
Id.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8. GINGER, supra note 1, at 587.
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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convictions led them to argue, in briefs and opinions, in favor of
the positions that ultimately were supported in the Warren era.
Perhaps it is surprising to find Justice Sutherland writing the
opinion in the Powell case," upholding the right of poor, black
defendants to adequate counsel, since he was known to all as an
archconservative justice. But is not surprising to find that judges
such as Fahy, Wright, Tuttle and others were writing opinions that
later became the law of the land by decision of the Supreme Court.
Indeed, author Ginger mentions the decision of Judge Waring of
South Carolina in one of the cases decided under the title of Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka. 2 She states that his dissenting
opinion "foreshadowed almost every issue, every tactic, every basic
'3
problem in the school desegregation cases that were to follow,'
but she only suggests the special significance of the advocacy of
the human rights position by him and other trial judges. Similarly,
the lawyers who presented the civil rights cases, beginning in the
trial courts and working up to the Supreme Court, played a vital
part in the changes that the Supreme Court decisions made final.
One wonders what would have happened to Gideon without the
arguments prepared by Counsel Abe Fortas, and to many other
parties to the landmark cases that were argued by Thurgood Marshall before he joined the Court. This inadequate treatment of
these background factors left me feeling a need for a more enlightening explanation of why the Warren era was so productive of
"landmark cases" in the highest court. The author states that the
"Court did not stop handing down decisions on human rights cases
when Earl Warren stepped down,"' 4 but I would like to have seen
more recognition that advocacy of human rights did not start when
the Warren era began. The earlier struggles and victories are also
part of the "realities of the law."
When the author did discuss the social and historical conditions that preceded the decisions, I had an uncomfortable feeling
that the observations were tailored to support the conclusion that
the justices on the Warren Court who made the "right" decisions
were almost unique in their convictions. For example, the author
stated that "the Brown decision did not grow out of a deep conviction held by the people or by the other two branches of government-Congress and the President. The court was almost alone in
feeling that the time had come to integrate the public schools."'"
There is no citation of authority for that statement and it makes me
11. Id.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. GINGER, supra note 1, at 416.
14. Id. at xvi.

15. Id. at 428.
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uncomfortable. For example, Congress, at the urging of some
Presidents, was passing civil rights acts during this same period. I
wonder if many of the American people were not merely unaware
of their own conviction in these fields.
The Warren Court showed us the light, time and time again,
but I am not prepared to classify those who had not rounded the
bend in the tunnel as blind to the people's rights. Nor do I think we
should overlook the landmark decisions and eloquent jurists of
earlier eras that provided the Warren Court with precedents for its
triumphal rulings. Chief Justice Warren was meticulous in citing
those precedents: "Over the years, this Court has consistently
repudiated ...

"

he said, in one of his "landmark" decisions. 6 It

does not detract from the quality of his leadership to recall the
triumphs of the past, but it does better illuminate the judicial
system.
Michael H. Cardozo*
16. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
* A.B., Dartmouth University; LL.B. 1935, Yale University; Executive Director, Association of American Law Schools, 1963-73; Administrator, PREVIEW
OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES, 1973-75.

